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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief.
First, the court appointed counsel for the pro se Petitioner at his request,
but then did not allow counsel to withdraw after he had been discharged
repeatedly by Mr. Hawkins. The court did not even rule on the renewed motions
for withdrawal of counsel or hold requested hearings even though the duty to
inquire was triggered.
Second, the Court detailed the record from the criminal case, but failed to
ever take judicial notice of it, and it was not otherwise made part of the postconviction record. Accordingly, there was actually no record upon which the
court could base its dismissal.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At over ten years and counting, this case and its background defies
succinct description. The Idaho Supreme Court described the proceedings in
the criminal case in its opinion in State v. Hawkins, 159 Idaho 507 (2015):
In January of 2008, a jury convicted Hawkins of two counts of
robbery. At trial, Hawkins admitted that he robbed banks but
claimed that he did so under duress that stemmed from his
previous involvement with various government agencies, including
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). Subsequently, the Court of Appeals determined that
the district court erred when it did not "sua sponte order a
psychiatric evaluation and conduct a hearing . . . ." State v.
Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 783, 229 P.3d 379, 388 (Ct. App. 2009)
(emphasis original) [hereafter Hawkins I]. The Court of Appeals
vacated Hawkins' judgment of conviction and remanded the case
so that Hawkins could undergo a competency evaluation pursuant
1

to Idaho Code sections 18-211 and 18-212. Id. Significantly, the
Court of Appeals opinion stated:
Because it is not possible to retroactively make a
determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was
tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and leave
the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent
to stand trial.
Id.
On remand, the district court conducted a competency hearing on
November 12, 2010, where it heard testimony from licensed
psychologist Dr. Chad Sombke and licensed psychiatrist Dr.
Michael Estess. Both experts had evaluated Hawkins and
determined that Hawkins was competent during the entire course of
his legal proceedings. In its order of December 6, 2010, the district
court found that Hawkins was competent to stand trial in January of
2008 (the 2010 competency determination). However, the district
court determined that the above-quoted language from the Court of
Appeals was the law of the case and required it to retry the case.
The State successfully moved for leave to pursue a permissive
interlocutory appeal to this Court.
On appeal, this Court reversed the district court's decision, holding
that "[n]either the law of the case doctrine nor I.A.R. 38 prevents
the district court from making a retroactive competency
determination as to Hawkins in this case." State v. Hawkins, 155
Idaho 69, 75, 305 P.3d 513, 519 (2013) [hereafter Hawkins II]. Due
to the narrow issue presented by the permissive appeal, we did not
address Hawkins' claim that the 2010 competency determination
violated Hawkins' due process rights. Id. at 74-75, 305 P.3d at 51819.
On remand, the State filed a motion asking the district court to take
judicial notice of its 2010 competency determination. The district
court granted the State's request to take judicial notice of the
evidence that led to its 2010 competency determination and
determined that it was appropriate to conduct another competency
hearing to give Hawkins the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses and present expert testimony. The district court
presumed that its previous determination that Hawkins was
competent was correct, but it stated this "presumption" would be
"subject to cross-examination and hearing from [Hawkins'] expert."
The district court set the hearing for August 29, 2013.
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Id. p. 509-510.
The Supreme Court continued:
On June 6, 2013, Hawkins' retained counsel moved that Hawkins
be declared a needy person for the purpose of hiring an expert
witness. The district court granted the motion and instructed
Hawkins' counsel to "direct any specific requests for services to this
Court for prior approval." On June 28, 2013, Hawkins' attorney
moved for leave to withdraw because Hawkins no longer wished for
the attorney to represent him. At hearing, Hawkins expressed his
desire to proceed pro se. The district court stated Hawkins' desire
to represent himself was a "conundrum," explaining that Hawkins'
pro se representation in a hearing where his main argument was
that he was incompetent "creates a real conflict in the court's way
of looking at this thing." The district court again explained to
Hawkins that he had the right to a public defender and conducted
an extensive Faretta inquiry. The district court granted Hawkins'
request to proceed pro se and appointed the public defender to
serve as standby counsel.
Afterwards, Hawkins filed many pro se motions. At a status
conference on July 17, 2013, the district court acknowledged these
motions but deferred ruling on them because the "sole issue"
before it was whether Hawkins was competent to stand trial in
2008. Hawkins informed the district court that he had not
subpoenaed Dr. Estess for cross-examination and that he had not
met with Dr. Claude Robert Cloninger, the psychiatrist that Hawkins
wished to hire as an expert witness. The district court warned
Hawkins that his competency hearing was rapidly approaching and
that Hawkins needed to subpoena witnesses so that they could
testify at the hearing.
Another status conference was held two weeks later. Hawkins told
the district court that he had contacted Dr. Cloninger by email and
that Dr. Cloninger was "awaiting verification for payment." In
response to questioning, Hawkins informed the district court that
Dr. Cloninger's fee was $450 an hour and that he would have to be
compensated for travel and lodging because he resided in St.
Louis, Missouri. The district court found that using public funds to
pay for Dr. Cloninger was "not reasonable" and vacated the
competency hearing scheduled for August 29, 2013.
On August 13, 2013, the district court issued a written order where
it found that the costs for obtaining Dr. Cloninger "could easily
3

exceed $20,000." The district court stated that it had reviewed "the
State Board of Medicine list of psychologists and psychiatrists" and
determined that "there are many qualified experts in this field in the
Boise, Nampa, Caldwell and Twin Falls area that could provide
expert opinion to the Court regarding the defendant's competency
to proceed now and retroactively." The district court ordered
Hawkins to submit to an examination by a local expert, disclose his
choice of expert by August 29, 2013, and submit to examination
within thirty days of the date of disclosure. The order further
provided that "[f]ailure of the defendant to submit to examination
within this time period will preclude the defendant from presenting
expert witness testimony at the retroactive competency hearing."
The order also noted, but did not decide, various other motions
Hawkins had filed. The district court did, however, deny Hawkins'
motion to strike Dr. Estess' testimony "because there is no basis in
fact or law to grant such a motion." . . . .
On October 7, 2013, the district court issued an order setting a
hearing for October 17, 2013, to "select a psychologist/psychiatrist
to evaluate the defendant." The order further provided that "[i]n the
event the defendant does not submit in writing prior to the hearing
his selection of a psychologist/psychiatrist the court then will make
the selection."
Hawkins did not notify the district court of his selection before the
October 17th hearing. At the hearing Hawkins, once again, told the
district court that he wanted Dr. Cloninger to evaluate him. The
district court then stated that it would appoint Dr. Robert Engle to
evaluate Hawkins and Hawkins responded that he would not
participate in an evaluation by Dr. Engle. After a break to confer
with standby counsel, Hawkins requested a seven-day continuance
so that he could have time to decide whether his standby counsel
would become attorney of record. The district court denied this
request, explaining that "[t]his has been going on since April." The
district court again took a recess to give Hawkins time to confer
with standby counsel. Before recessing, the district court outlined
three options for Hawkins, stating:
[I]f [standby counsel] is going to be your counsel, I'll give him
an opportunity to go out in the community, find a psychiatrist
or psychologist and testify on your behalf. And that's not
going to be revocable on your part. He is going to be your
counsel.
Or Option 2 is that you submit to Dr. Engle's evaluation. The
court would appoint Dr. Engle, and he would be given an
4

opportunity to evaluate you, submit a report to the court,
[and] proceed accordingly.
Or Option 3, if you decline to submit to an evaluation by Dr.
Engle, the court then will sentence you here forthwith today.
Following the recess, Hawkins informed the district court that he
had decided to be represented by standby counsel and suggested
that his parents might be able to retain Dr. Cloninger. The district
court stated that it was "not going to proceed down that path"
without Hawkins showing that his parents had committed to pay Dr.
Cloninger. The district court reiterated its decision that Hawkins
would not be able to "fire" his attorney if he elected to be
represented and that the district court would not condition the
appointment of counsel on Hawkins' ability to hire Dr. Cloninger.
Hawkins evidently became angry and stated: "Then you should just
sentence me today." After determining that standby counsel did not
have difficulty communicating with Hawkins during their "brief
discussions," and that Hawkins was not on any psychotropic
medications, the district court proceeded to sentencing. The district
court then found as follows:
Well, the court will find from the totality of the record that Mr.
Hawkins, particularly in light of the extensive motions that he
has filed since this was submitted back to the court in April of
this year . . . is competent, and he understands the nature of
the proceeding, that he has made a decision, and I find him to
have made a knowing and intelligent decision to continue to
insist that a psychiatrist from St. Louis, Missouri, be
appointed to testify on his behalf for his articulated basis for
not appointing that psychiatrist, that there have been
numerous delays caused as a result of again Mr. Hawkins['] .
. . failure to follow through with the court's specific order. The
court will find that there has been ample opportunity afforded
to Mr. Hawkins to present evidence to the court regarding his
mental status at his trial in 2007 [sic].
The court will find that the testimony and evidence presented
to the court by Dr. Estess that Mr. Hawkins was competent to
stand trial, that he was at the time of his evaluation by both
Dr. Sombke and Dr. Estess was capable of understanding the
proceedings, assisting in his defense, and that that remains
the case today.
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The district court then re-imposed Hawkins' original sentence,
consisting of concurrent unified life sentences, with thirty years
fixed. Hawkins timely appealed.
Id. at 510-512.
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the district court.
On February 13, 2015, Mr. Hawkins timely filed a pro se form verified
petition for post-conviction relief with attachments. (R. p. 6-75.) He also filed a
motion and affidavit in support of appointment of counsel. (R. p. 76-78.)
The state brought a motion to dismiss arguing the petition was untimely
which it later withdrew because it was timely filed. (R. p. 80-81, 83-84, 89-90.)
Mr. Hawkins filed what purported to be a Rule 35 motion, but the court
determined that it belonged in the instant case. (R. p. 86-87, 100-101.)
The court appointed counsel. (R. p. 93.) Mr. Hawkins filed a pro se
objection to the state’s motion to dismiss and motion to correct record with
attachments. (R. p. 94-96, 97-98.) The court entered an order stating that no
action would be taken on the objection since the state had withdrawn its motion
to dismiss. (R. p. 105.)
The state then filed a new response to the petition for post-conviction relief
and motion to dismiss. (R. p. 106-109.) Next, the state moved to suspend the
proceedings until the last Supreme Court appeal was concluded (and it was
suspended). (R. p. 110-111.)
Appointed conflict counsel then entered his appearance. (R. p. 113.)
The court then issued an order directing the clerk not to file any pro se
documents from Mr. Hawkins since he was represented and ordered that they
instead be sent to counsel who can decide whether to file them. (R. p. 115.)
6

Some six months after his appointment, on September 28, 2015,
appointed counsel filed a Motion to Include Affidavit in Pro Se Petition for PostConviction Relief. (R. p. 125.) Appointed counsel explained that Mr. Hawkins
sent his pro se affidavit to the court, but it was not filed and was instead sent to
appointed counsel who was now filing it. (R. p. 125-126.)
The motion continued:
Counsel for Petitioner has repeatedly been discharged or fired by
Hawkins. A motion to withdraw is forthcoming. However, it is
counsel's belief that the attached petition is relevant to the pro se
petition for relief now on file. Counsel would ask that this affidavit
be considered by the court in consideration of the claims now made
by Petitioner in this action.
Motion to Include Affidavit in Pro Se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at p. 2. (R.
p. 126.)
At the same time, appointed counsel filed his Motion and Affidavit for
Leave to Withdraw as Counsel. As grounds, appointed counsel stated that Mr.
Hawkins had expressed dissatisfaction with counsel, and he desired counsel no
longer represent him and that there was a lack of cooperation from Mr. Hawkins
that precluded counsel from adequately representing him. (R. p. 129-130.)
At a hearing on February 17, 2016, the court denied the motion to
withdraw as counsel (further detailed below). The court also suggested
appointed counsel file an amended petition for post-conviction relief.
On March 11, 2016, appointed counsel filed a notice of lodging Pleadings
of Faron Hawkins and Renewed Motion to Withdraw. (R. p. 140.) Attached, inter
alia, were Mr. Hawkins’ Notice of Appeal of Judge Bail’s Ruling to Not Remove
Lawyer [appointed counsel] for and Failure to Hold a Hearing As Required by
7

Law, Decision, State v. Bias, as well as Complaint for Injunctive, Declaratory,
Compensatory, Punitive Damages and Investigation, Charges for Ongoing
Criminal Enterprise with Admission! ITCA Filed Timely "Demand for Jury Trial"Motion this Court to Take Judicial Notice of ACLU Suit CVOC-1510240, CRFE2007-5. (R. p. 140-141.) According to appointed counsel, this last action names
him as one of the many defendants. (R. p. 141.)
On March 11, 2016, appointed counsel filed a motion requesting that the
court’s order prohibiting pro se filings be rescinded because Mr. Hawkins was
filing pleadings that were adverse to appointed counsel and had told the court
that he wanted to proceed pro se or have other counsel, but the court denied
counsel’s motion to withdraw. (R. p. 226.) Counsel argued that he cannot be
placed in the position of having to decide whether to file documents when it could
create a conflict of interest in the representation. (R. p. 227.) A hearing was
requested.
Appointed counsel then lodged more pleadings of Faron Hawkins
consisting of over 100 pages, some of which concerned Mr. Hawkins’ attempts to
remove appointed counsel. (R. p. 229-230, 232-234, 242.)
On April 26, 2016, the state filed an answer, a motion for summary
disposition and brief in support, and a motion to take judicial notice of a specific
motion to suppress and transcript from a motion to suppress hearing. (R. p. 328,
330, 346-364.) The state characterized the claims as follows:
In his pro se petition, Hawkins makes approximately 46 claims. The
claims fall under six types: 1) Errors made by the court, 2)
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 3) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 4)
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Denial of his right to a Speedy Trial, 5) Errors related to the return
of his indictment, 6) Additional claims.
R. p. 352.1
On May 4, 2016, appointed counsel filed an affidavit in support of a
renewed motion to withdraw as counsel which stated as follows in relevant part:
4. That I am unable to effectively communicate with, or establish
any attorney client relationship with Mr. Hawkins;
5. Per the Courts Order of February 17, 2016 my office did prepare
a proposed supplemental amended petition for relief. I mailed that
to Mr. Hawkins on April 8, 2016. I have not received any response
from Mr. Hawkins;
6. Mr. Hawkins continues to file pro se motions and pleadings;
7. Mr. Hawkins continues to object to my office providing any legal
assistance whatsoever;
8. I cannot provide any further assistance to the Court of [sic] client
in this matter. There is a conflict of interest under the rules and I
must withdraw as attorney of record.
R. p. 365-366.
On May 18, 2016, appointed counsel filed another notice of lodging of
pleadings of Faron Hawkins. (R. p. 367.) This included an affidavit detailing the
supposed failings of appointed counsel. (R. p. 369-371.)

On June 1, 2016,

appointed counsel filed yet another notice of lodging pleadings of Faron Hawkins.
(R. p. 405.)
On June 1, 2016, appointed counsel filed his supplemental petition for
post-conviction relief which included claims which were to be added to, and not
replace, Mr. Hawkins’ pro se claims. (R. p. 546-550.)

1

Appointed counsel characterized it as 33 claims. (R. p. 647.)
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On October 19, 2016, the court issued its notice of intent to dismiss. (R. p.
610.) The court did so because it would be dismissing claims on other than the
state’s grounds. (R. p. 627.)
The court then explained the various reasons it would be dismissing all of
the claims, which it succinctly stated in its conclusion:
. . . Despite the numerous filings, Hawkins has failed to come
forward with admissible evidence to make a prima facie claim for
post-conviction relief; therefore as a matter of law, the Court will
summarily dismiss his petition. Hawkins himself acted as his own
attorney; therefore, he does not have an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. His due process claim regarding the failure to serve
subpoenas should have been raised on appeal. It is also bare and
conclusory, unsupported by admissible evidence. His claims that he
was denied due process of law when the trial court held a
retroactive competency hearing and allowed him to proceed to trial
without counsel were both barred by res judicata. His other claims
either were or should have been raised in appeal. His claim
regarding jail conditions is not properly before this court and his
claim regarding parole eligibility is not appropriate in this type of
case. Hawkins failed to make a prima facie showing of a claim for
post-conviction relief and his application for postconviction relief will
be summarily dismissed.
R. p. 638.
On October 31, 2016, appointed counsel filed “Another Motion to
Withdraw” and requested a hearing. (R. p. 639.)
After receiving an enlargement of time, on November 22, 2016, appointed
counsel also filed an objection to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss and
memorandum in support regarding the three claims in the supplemental petition.
(R. p. 644, 645, 647-655.)
On December 21, 2016, the court issued its one page Order Dismissing
Petition which contained no further analysis. (R. p 657.) A separate judgment
was entered. (R. p. 659.)
10

Petitioner timely appeals. (R. p. 660.)
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ISSUES
I.
Whether the district court erred by denying the motion to withdraw as counsel
and then by failing to rule on or even hold a hearing on appointed counsel’s
repeated motions to withdraw

II.
Whether the court erred when it failed to take judicial notice of the underlying
criminal case so there was actually no record upon which the court could base
its dismissal
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred by Not Allowing Appointed Counsel to Withdraw as
Counsel and Then by Failing to Hear or Rule on Counsel’s Repeated
Motions to Withdraw
As explained above, appointed counsel brought a motion to withdraw as
counsel. At the hearing, the court stated that its practice was to appoint counsel
where there had been a jury trial. Further, the court stated that in this case the
petition was incoherent. (Tr. p. 11-12.)

The court repeatedly suggested that

appointed counsel could file an amended petition. (Tr. p. 14.)
Mr. Hawkins personally addressed the court and objected because
according to him, appointed counsel refused to see him even once and while Mr.
Hawkins had called him many times, he had only talked to him once.

Also,

appointed counsel had refused to file any documents including those which Mr.
Hawkins received from his former appellate attorney. Finally, he requested that
said former appellate attorney be appointed. (Tr. p. 15.)
The following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: . . . . I don’t see a benefit to you in post-conviction
proceedings to deprive yourself of knowledgeable assistance. And I
would like to see if we can’t get this to maybe work out.
THE DEFENDANT: I would object then and ask you to appoint
another public defender for me.
THE COURT: Well, if counsel reviews his records and determines
that there is some kind of conflict, I think counsel is experienced
and knows what to do. But I’m not—no one has a right when it’s
appointed counsel to have a particular appointed counsel. It doesn’t
work that way.
THE DEFENDANT: And then I would ask to go pro se.
13

THE COURT: And like I said, at this point I don’t think that’s
prudent. And I would like to see if things can’t get worked out. At
some later date, we might see where we are. At least at this point,
you ought to have some more skillful assistance, so that if you have
some real issues that they get properly raised, so they don’t get
overlooked.
.
.
.
THE COURT: . . . . And I want to encourage you right now to see
if you can’t work it out with counsel. I will—I am not barring you
forever from this. I just think it will help you at this stage to have a
legal and trained person to talk to and write out or write to and
layout what you think your problems are so that you have a better
chance of presenting legitimate issues you have in a good way so
it doesn’t harm you.
So I would like to give it a try for now. I’m not barring it. I am not
barring something to change later. But at this point I am not going
to grant the motion to withdraw. I will see if we can sort it out. . . .
Tr. p. 21, ln. 11—p. 23, ln. 20.
Contrary to what the court stated, its denial of the motion to withdraw was
a complete bar. Counsel filed another four motions to withdraw as counsel and
the court never ruled on them or even had a hearing despite requests.
To begin with, the court erred by failing to allow counsel to withdraw. The
court did place appointed counsel in an untenable position where he had to
review Mr. Hawkins’ filings and, if appropriate, file them, when those filings
themselves contained Mr. Hawkins’ complaints against appointed counsel. If
appointed counsel failed to file the documents Mr. Hawkins would no doubt
believe he was hiding them to protect himself. Yet if he filed them, appointed
counsel

would be required to provide the court with his client’s complaints

against himself. Further, one of the filings actually showed appointed counsel
had been named in a lawsuit by Mr. Hawkins, creating a clear conflict.
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While it may very well have been more convenient for the district court to
have an attorney to deal with instead of Mr. Hawkins himself (although Judge
McLaughlin and the Supreme Court had to deal with a pro se Mr. Hawkins), this
cannot justify creating that sort of adversarial relationship between attorney and
client.
Even assuming arguendo that the court was correct in denying the first
motion to withdraw as counsel, it nevertheless erred when it refused to ever
consider the subsequent requests to withdraw or to even hold a hearing. As
pointed out above, appointed counsel moved to withdraw another four times,
some of the motions attaching Mr. Hawkins’ requests/demands that he withdraw
and to either appoint substitute counsel or allow him to proceed pro se.
Further, Mr. Hawkins repeatedly requested a hearing following the Court
of Appeals case of State v. Bias, 341 P.3d 1264 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). While
that was a criminal case, it is nonetheless instructive to our case. In Bias, the
Supreme Court explained that the right to inquiry into substitute counsel had a
due process component even in a post-conviction case.
Finally, some inquiry may be guaranteed by procedural due
process. See Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342, 160 P.3d
1275 (Ct. App. 2007) (The post-conviction petitioner did not enjoy a
constitutionally-protected right to counsel; nonetheless, the court
considered whether an inquiry was sufficient under general
procedural due process principles. Although the right to an inquiry
cases were not binding precedent, they were discussed as
persuasive authority.).
Id. p. 1267.
While the court obviously hoped at the hearing that things would work
themselves out between Mr. Hawkins and appointed counsel, this clearly did not
15

happen.

Both Mr. Hawkins and appointed counsel continued to request

appointed counsel be allowed to withdraw and either substitute counsel
appointed or Mr. Hawkins be allowed to proceed pro se. Additionally, appointed
counsel repeatedly requested a hearing.
The court’s response to all this was to ignore it and not rule on any of the
subsequent motions to withdraw or even hold a hearing.

Since the duty to

inquire was triggered, the court erred by doing nothing. Accordingly, this matter
must be reversed and remanded for either appointment of substitute counsel or
to allow Mr. Hawkins to proceed pro se, or to at least have a hearing on the
matter.

II.
The Court Erred When It Failed to Take Judicial Notice of the Underlying
Criminal Case so There Was Actually No Record Upon Which
the Court Could Base Its Dismissal
The notice of intent to dismiss contained 14 pages detailing the procedure
of the criminal case. (R. p. 611-625.) Unfortunately, the district court mostly did
not cite to where in the record the information it related exists. In fact, there are
only a total of six citations to pleadings, filed items and/or transcripts in the
criminal case in those 14 pages. Of those, it appears only one item is in the
post-conviction record, to wit, the transcript of the competency hearing, which
had been filed as an attachment by appointed counsel. (R. p. 620-621.) In other
words, while the post-conviction court was clearly familiar with the criminal case
16

record, it was not made a part of the instant case.2

The court never even took

judicial notice of the specific documents and suppression hearing transcript as
requested by the state.

While Mr. Hawkins attached various criminal case

documents to his post-conviction filings, they were very limited and certainly did
not include the entire criminal case record, or even a fraction thereof.
The Idaho Court of Appeals held in Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644
(Ct.App. 1994):
A post-conviction proceeding is not an extension of the criminal
case from which it arises. Rather, it is a separate civil action in
which the applicant bears the burden of proof imposed upon a civil
plaintiff. No part of the record from the criminal case becomes part
of the record in the post-conviction proceeding unless it is entered
as a exhibit. Transcripts of the pretrial proceedings, the trial, and
sentencing hearing in the criminal case, even if previously prepared
as a result of a direct appeal or otherwise, are not before the trial
court in the post-conviction proceeding and do not become part of
the record on appeal unless presented as exhibits. . . .
Id. p. 648 (internal citations omitted).
In short, since the district court failed to take judicial notice of the criminal
case proceedings and the entire record (or even more than a fraction of it) was
not otherwise made part of the post-conviction, there was actually no record
upon which the district court could base its dismissal. Accordingly, the dismissal
must be reversed and remanded to the district court so a proper record can be
created.

While the district court did quote and cite to the various published opinions and
some of what happened below can be gleaned from them, by no means did the
published opinions provide the level of detail used by the district court.
2
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner
respectfully requests that the district court’s order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and remanded to the district court
for appointment of substitute counsel or for Mr. Hawkins to proceed pro se and
for a proper record to be created.
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2017.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey ___
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Appellant
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